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THE UNITED STATES IS UNWILLING TO PROTECT GANG-BASED ASYLUM APPLICANTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

There is a noticeable difference between how courts treat asylum applicants from
Central America with gang-based asylum claims and how they treat asylum
applicants from Colombia with Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)1
based asylum claims. Typically, courts view applicants with gang-based asylum
claims less favorably than applicants with FARC-based asylum claims. As a result,
applicants from Central America with gang-based asylum claims are more often
denied asylum and compelled to return to their home countries.
This is noteworthy because the circumstances under which FARC-based asylum
applicants are granted asylum—that they are unable or unwilling to return to their
home countries because of past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of political opinion—are shared by gang-based asylum applicants. Central
American asylum applicants fear persecution on account of political opinion, as their
home countries have increasingly come under the control of violent gangs that their
governments are unable or unwilling to control.2
In recent years, there has been a massive increase in violence in El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras.3 In 2015, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala ranked
first, fifth, and sixth, respectively, in global homicide rates.4 This extreme violence
has forced many to flee from Central America to the United States.5 Recently, it has
been so dangerous for residents to remain in these countries that nearly ten per cent
of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras’s thirty million residents have left.6 This
mass exodus made headlines when approximately 100,000 unaccompanied minors
arrived at the United States’ southern border between October 2013 and July 2015.7

1.

The FARC is Colombia’s largest rebel group. Who Are the Farc?, BBC News (Nov. 24, 2016), http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36605769. It was “founded in 1964 as the armed wing of the
Communist Party and follow[s] a Marxist-Leninist ideology.” Id. FARC is an acronym, which stands
for Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia. FARC, InSight Crime, http://www.insightcrime.
org/colombia-organized-crime-news/farc-profile (last updated Mar. 3, 2017).

2.

See UNHCR, Women on the Run: First-Hand Accounts of Refugees Fleeing El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico 2 (2015), http://www.unhcr.org/5630f24c6.pdf.

3.

Id. at 16.

4.

Ashley Kirk, Mapped: Which Countries Have the Highest Murder Rates?, Telegraph (Dec. 11, 2015,
10:07 AM GMT), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/12037479/Mapped-Whichcountries-have-the-highest-murder-rates.html. In addition, a 2015 report by the UNHCR found, “El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras rank first, third, and seventh, respectively, for rates of female
homicides globally.” UNHCR, supra note 2, at 16.

5.

Danielle Renwick, Central America’s Violent Northern Triangle, Council on Foreign Rel. (Jan. 19,
2016), http://www.cfr.org/transnational-crime/central-americas-violent-northern-triangle/p37286.

6.

Id.

7.

Id.
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Central American gangs are not only extremely violent, but they are also de facto
governments8 with control over large areas of these Central American countries.9
Millions are forced to flee their home countries every year because they face
persecution.10 The global community created international protection for these
individuals after World War II,11 in response to the international failure to protect
those f leeing the Holocaust.12 In 1951 and 1967, governments implemented
international treaties that require signatory countries “to offer refuge to individuals
who have a well-founded fear of returning to their home countries.”13 In 1980, the
United States codified these international laws into U.S. domestic law by enacting
the Refugee Act of 1980.14
U.S. asylum law provides that individuals may qualify as refugees if they can
show that they are unable or unwilling to return to their country because of past
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.15 From
these requirements, courts derive several elements that must be satisfied for an
applicant to be eligible for asylum.16
This note examines the disparate treatment between asylum applicants from
Central America with gang-based asylum claims and asylum applicants from Colombia
with FARC-based asylum claims, and contends that both groups should be treated
equally. This is because both groups are fleeing from countries overrun by groups
acting as persecutors and from criminal organizations exerting political control.
Part II of this note discusses the history of asylum law, its codification into U.S.
domestic law, and the origins and current status of Central American gangs and the
FARC.17 Part III confronts the disparate, and less favorable, treatment received by
Central American asylum applicants with gang-based asylum claims. It also analyzes
8.

A de facto government is a term applied to “[a] government that has taken over the regular government
and exercises sovereignty over a country” or “[a]n independent government established and exercised by
a group of a country’s inhabitants who have separated themselves from the parent state.” Government: De
Facto Government, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).

9.

Max G. Manwaring, A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty: Gangs and Other
Illicit Transnational Criminal Organizations in Central America, El Salvador, Mexico,
Jamaica, and Brazil 21 (2007), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub837.pdf.

10.

Lenni B. Benson et al., Immigration and Nationality Law 855 (2013).

11.

Id.; Immigration Equal., Immigration Equality Asylum Manual 10 (3d. ed. 2014), http://www.
immigrationequality.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Immigration-Equality_Asylum_Manual.pdf;
see infra text accompanying notes 18–23.

12.

Benson et al., supra note 10, at 855.

13.

Id.

14.

Id.

15.

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012).

16.

See infra text accompanying note 27.

17.

Despite both groups currently acting as criminal organizations that wield political control, the genesis
of Central American gangs and the FARC explains courts’ unequal treatment between residents who
flee Central American gangs and those who flee the FARC.
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how a government’s lack of will or ability to control persecutors is determined when
adjudicating asylum. Part IV reviews the primary and alternative solutions available
to gang-based asylum applicants. Part V concludes that the disparate and less
favorable treatment received by asylum applicants with gang-based asylum claims is
problematic because there is a humanitarian crisis in Central America, and the
United States is failing to protect its victims seeking asylum.
II. HISTORY OF ASYLUM LAW, THE FARC, AND CENTRAL AMERICAN GANGS

A. The History of Asylum Law in the United States

The right of a state to grant asylum is well established in international law.18 The
centerpiece of international refugee protection is found in the United Nations 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Convention”).19 The Convention
was drafted in response to the large migrations from war-torn Europe after World
War II.20 It defines who are refugees, their rights, and the states’ legal obligations to
them.21 The Convention was limited to individuals fleeing events that occurred in
Europe after World War II and before January 1951.22 The 1967 Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees (“Protocol”) removed the Convention’s geographical and
temporal restrictions, and provided universal protection for refugees.23
Asylum law in the United States is based on the Convention and Protocol.24 To
comply with the Protocol, the United States passed the Refugee Act of 1980, which
includes a similar definition of “refugee” to that in the Convention and Protocol.25
The Refugee Act of 1980 defines refugees as people who are outside their country of
nationality and are unable or unwilling to return to that country because of past
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.26 Therefore,
asylum applicants must demonstrate all of the following: (1) they are outside their
country of nationality or last habitual residence; (2) they are unable or unwilling to
return; (3) they cannot or will not return because of past persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution; and (4) their persecution was on account of a protected

18.

Felice Morgenstern, The Right of Asylum, 26 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 327, 327 (1949).

19.

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189
U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1968) [hereinafter Convention].

20. Immigration Equal., supra note 11, at 10.
21.

Convention, supra note 19, 189 U.N.T.S. at 152.

22.

Id. at 152, 154.

23.

Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. I, ¶ 3, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267
[hereinafter Protocol].

24.

Immigration Equal., supra note 11, at 10.

25.

Id.

26. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012).
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ground.27 Protected grounds are race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, and political opinion.28
B. The History of the FARC

The FARC began as a group of farmers who fled to the mountains to escape
political violence that broke out after the death of a Liberal Party presidential
contender in 1948. 29 It comprised what were essentially self-defense militias who
rarely engaged in armed combat with the Colombian government.30 However, change
came when the Colombian government began to fear the spread of communism.31 In
May 1964, the Colombian government attempted to defeat these militias in what is
often considered the start of Colombia’s modern-day guerrilla war.32 These events
convinced the militias to revolutionize, and to embark in efforts to overthrow the
sitting government and impose a Marxist government.33
The FARC originated before the global expansion of Colombia’s illegal drug
trade.34 For some time, the FARC had refused to participate in the illegal drug trade
because it viewed the drug trade as destructive to its revolutionary principles.35 But
by the 1980s, the FARC had succumbed to the lure of the money to be had by
venturing into the illegal drug trade. 36 By the 1990s, a majority of the FARC’s
resources came from the illegal drug trade and other criminal activities. 37 The
violence that has resulted from the FARC’s criminal activities has forced more than
five million Colombians from their homes.38
It is estimated that the FARC generates funds from the illegal drug trade totaling
between $500 million and $600 million annually.39 In a 2013 report, InSight Crime
found, “the FARC is one of the most powerful drug trafficking syndicates in

27.

See id.

28. Id.
29. John Otis, Wilson Ctr., The FARC and Colombia’s Illegal Drug Trade 3 (2014), https://www.

wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Otis_FARCDrugTrade2014.pdf.

30. Id.
31.

Id.

32.

Id.

33.

Id.

34. Id.; Profiles: Colombia’s Armed Groups, BBC News (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-

latin-america-11400950.

35.

Otis, supra note 29, at 3.

36. Id.
37.

Profiles: Colombia’s Armed Groups, supra note 34.

38. Otis, supra note 29, at 1.
39.

The Guerilla Groups in Colombia, UNRIC, http://www.unric.org/en/colombia/27013-the-guerrillagroups-in-colombia (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).
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Colombia, and perhaps the world.”40 Álvaro Uribe, the President of Colombia from
2002 to 2010, refused to acknowledge that Colombia was involved in an armed
conflict with political rebels, and instead identified the FARC as a narco-terrorist
organization.41
In recent years, the FARC has released statements that it intends to end the armed
conflict and become a legal political movement.42 Negotiations for peace between the
FARC and the Colombian government have been ongoing since 2012.43 The FARC
is on the list of terrorist organizations in both the United States and Europe.44
C. The History of Central American Gangs

The most powerful gangs currently operating in Central America are the 18th
Street gang (“M-18”) and the Mara Salvatrucha (“MS-13”).45 Both of these gangs
also operate within the United States.46
In the 1960s, the M-18 originated in the United States by Mexicans who were
not accepted into existing Hispanic gangs.47 Eventually, the M-18 became known as
the gang willing to recruit members from different races and nations of origin.48 In
the 1980s, the MS-13 originated in Los Angeles by Salvadorans who fled civil war
in El Salvador,49 in part to protect Salvadorans who recently had immigrated to the
United States from existing gangs.50
40. Jeremy McDermott, InSight Crime, The FARC, the Peace Process and the Potential

Criminalisation of the Guerrillas 18 (2013). In 2016, InSight Crime reaffirmed the FARC’s
dominance in the world drug trade. Jeremy McDermott, What Does Colombia Peace Deal Mean for
Cocaine Trade?, InSight Crime (Aug. 24, 2016), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/whatdoes-colombia-peace-deal-mean-for-cocaine-trade (stating that “the FARC are the single most
important organization in the world cocaine trade”).

41.

Otis, supra note 29, at 11. Narcoterrorism is “the use of drug trafficking to advance the objectives of
certain governments and terrorist organizations.” Rachel Ehrenfeld, Narco Terrorism, at xiii (1990).

42.

FARC Aims to Become a Political Movement, TeleSUR (Feb. 8, 2015), http://www.telesurtv.net/english/
news/FARC-Aims-to-Become-a-Political-Movement-20150208-0013.html.

43.

Id.

44. Profiles: Colombia’s Armed Groups, supra note 34.
45.

Bill Grinstead, Why Haven’t Violent Mara Gangs Spread to Costa Rica?, Costa Rica Star (Aug. 23,
2013), http://news.co.cr/why-havent-violent-mara-gangs-spread-to-costa-rica/25364.

46. Clare Ribando Seelke, Cong. Research Serv., RL34112, Gangs in Central America 3 (2016),

https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf. They originated in the United States, but now dominate
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Leslie Berestein Rojas, Transnational Gangs: The Central
American Migrant Crisis’ LA Connection, 89.3 KPCC (July 16, 2014), http://www.scpr.org/blogs/
multiamerican/2014/07/16/17018/transnational-gangs-how-the-central-american-migra.

47.

Seelke, supra note 46, at 3.

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Sebastian Amar et al., CAIR Coal., Seeking Asylum from Gang-Based Violence in Central

America 1 (2007), http://lincolngoldfinch.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/CAIR-Gang-ResourceManual.pdf.
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The expansion of the MS-13 and M-18 accelerated after the United States
enacted the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)
of 1996.51 The IIRIRA significantly expanded the type of crimes for which
undocumented immigrants could be removed from the United States, even including
past crimes.52 In addition to undocumented immigrants, the IIRIRA also removed
protections afforded to legal permanent residents.53 According to Nancy Morawetz54:
Overnight, people who had formed their lives here—came here legally or
had adjusted to legal status, were working here, building their families, had
ordinary lives in which they were on the PTA and everything else—suddenly,
because of some conviction, weren’t even allowed to go in front of a judge
anymore. They were just fast-tracked to deportation.55

El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras were unprepared to provide the necessary
social services needed to support such a mass deportation of individuals, many of
whom were gang members.56 Therefore the IIRIRA, and the resulting mass
deportation of gang members from the United States to Central America, are widely
accepted as fundamental parts of the evolution of the MS-13 and M-18.57
The history of Central American gangs began during civil wars in El Salvador and
Nicaragua.58 These wars sent thousands fleeing to the United States for refuge.59 While
in the United States, some of these immigrants joined gangs in Los Angeles.60 Los
Angeles County Sheriff ’s Department’s gang specialist, John Sullivan believes that
“[t]hese gangs are part of the cultural fabric of the U.S., not Central America.”61 He
explains, “[w]e deport them, and they’re bigger and badder than any gangs there, and
they dominate. And now we have areas [in Central America] that are widely

51.

Seelke, supra note 46, at 3; see Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.).

52.

Rojas, supra note 46.

53.

It removed protection for legal residents, meaning even individuals who were in the United States legally
could be removed if they committed an offense included within the IIRIRA. Id.

54. Nancy Morawetz is a professor at NYU School of Law and teaches the Immigrant Rights Clinic.

Faculty: Nancy Morawetz, NYU L., https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/index.cfm?fuseaction=profile.
overview&personid=20146 (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).

55.

Dara Lind, The Disastrous, Forgotten 1996 Law That Created Today’s Immigration Problem, Vox (Apr. 28,
2016, 8:40 AM), http://www.vox.com/2016/4/28/11515132/iirira-clinton-immigration.

56. Rojas, supra note 46.
57.

Id.

58. Scott Johnson, American-Born Gangs Helping Drive Immigrant Crisis at U.S. Border, Nat’l Geographic

( July 25, 2014), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/07/140723-immigration-minorshonduras-gang-violence-central-america.

59.

Id.

60. Id.
61.

Id.
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destabilized, with a high degree of violence.”62 Essentially, these gangs went from being
loosely formed street gangs in the United States to dominant criminal organizations
that grew into de facto governments in certain areas of Central America.63
These gangs are involved in criminal activities such as drug trafficking, drug
smuggling, weapon smuggling, money laundering, alien smuggling, human
trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, home invasion, murder, and other violent
felonies.64 A significant portion of these violent crimes is attributed to the MS-13
and M-18, which operate with impunity.65 As a result, El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras consistently rank among the highest homicide rates in the world.66
The MS-13 and M-18 have increased their control over the citizens of these
countries and the governments appear either unable or unwilling to control these
gangs.67 The MS-13 and M-18 are no longer just groups of street thugs.68 A common
practice of these gangs is to charge a “tax” on residents and business owners in their
territories.69 Also, when individuals disobey these gangs’ rules there are systematic
consequences, which can be as extreme as murder.70 The MS-13 and M-18 continue
to threaten security and challenge government authority in Central America.71
III. DISPARATE TREATMENT OF GANG-BASED ASYLUM APPLICANTS

A. Finding a Political Opinion

Asylum applicants may be eligible for asylum owing to their inability or
unwillingness to return to their home country because of past persecution or a wellfounded fear of future persecution on account of their political opinion.72 A leading
62. Id. (alteration in original).
63. See Seelke, supra note 46, at 3, 5.
64. Id. at 3, 5, 7.
65.

WOLA, Central American Gang-Related Asylum: A Resource Guide 2–3 (2008), https://
www.wola.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/CA-Gang-Related-Asylum.pdf.

66. Kirk, supra note 4; see also UNODC, Global Study on Homicide 33 (2013), https://www.unodc.org/

documents/gsh/pdfs/2014_GLOBAL_HOMICIDE_BOOK_web.pdf.

67.

UNHCR, supra note 2, at 15–26.

68. Amar et al., supra note 50, at 1.
69. Id. at 1–2.
70. Id. at 1.
71.

Seelke, supra note 46, at 3–5.

72. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 (2017); see also Qualifying for Asylum, Pol. Asylum USA, http://www.

politicalasylumusa.com/application-for-asylum (last visited Apr. 6, 2017). Under U.S. asylum law,
political opinion is defined broadly. Political Opinion, Pol. Asylum USA, http://www.politicalasylumusa.
com/application-for-asylum/political-opinion-refugee (last visited Apr. 6, 2017). Many forms of free
speech, including forms that are not “political in nature,” are still worth protecting. Id. For example, in
some countries, speaking out against corruption can constitute asylum on the ground of political
opinion. Id.
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case in the area of asylum law is INS v. Elias-Zacarias.73 In this 1992 case, the
Supreme Court held that forced recruitment by a guerilla group was not necessarily
persecution on account of political opinion.74 This holding left open the possibility
that certain instances of gang recruitment could be classified as persecution on
account of political opinion.75
In 2008, in Matter of S-E-G- and Matter of E-A-G-, the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) stated that the respondents had not established direct or circumstantial
evidence that the gangs imputed,76 or would impute to the respondents, an anti-gang
political opinion.77 The BIA concluded that gang members have no motive other
than increasing the size and influence of their gang.78 Courts relying on Matter of
S-E-G- and Matter of E-A-G- have interpreted INS v. Elias-Zacarias to mean forced
recruitment alone cannot constitute persecution on account of political opinion.79
“These courts have found that resisters of gang recruitment are, instead, targeted
because of economic and personal reasons,” not political ones.80 This flawed reasoning
is the foundation of the disparate treatment between asylum applicants with gangbased asylum claims and those with FARC-based asylum claims.
In Rivera Barrientos v. Holder, the Tenth Circuit denied the existence of a political
opinion even when there was evidence of the applicant’s direct, vocal opposition to
the gang, the gang’s direct and vocal recognition of that opposition, and the gang’s
subsequent brutal attack on the applicant, when the gang held her at knife point and
gang raped her.81 The Tenth Circuit relied on INS v. Elias-Zacarias and held that the
applicant was targeted primarily for recruitment purposes and not because of a

73. 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
74.

Id. at 481–84.

75. See id.; infra text accompanying notes 140–42.
76. “[A] person’s imputed political opinion is also a ground for asylum in the U.S.” Political Opinion, supra

note 72. This means that if the state or a non-state actor persecutes an individual because it believes the
individual has a political opinion, the individual can qualify for asylum even if she does not have that
political opinion. Id.

77.

S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 589 (B.I.A. 2008); E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 596–97 (B.I.A. 2008).

78. S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 589; E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 597.
79. Dree K. Collopy, AILA’s Asylum Primer 453 (7th ed. 2015); see Mayorga-Vidal v. Holder, 675 F.3d

9, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting that showing one’s refusal to join a gang alone does not constitute
political opinion); Marroquin-Ochoma v. Holder, 574 F.3d 574, 578–79 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting that
“the mere refusal to join Mara Salvatrucha . . . does not compel a finding that the gang’s threats were on
account of an imputed political opinion”); Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 862 (9th Cir. 2009)
(similar), abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013);
Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 855–56 (9th Cir. 2009) (similar); Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d
738, 747 (9th Cir. 2008) (similar), abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d 1081.

80. Collopy, supra note 79, at 453.
81.

658 F.3d 1222, 1227–28 (10th Cir. 2011).
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political opinion.82 The Tenth Circuit ignored contrary evidence,83 as well as the
“socio-political context in which the persecution occurred.”84
In contrast, in Martinez-Buendia v. Holder, the Seventh Circuit found a political
opinion when the asylum applicant demonstrated past persecution by the FARC on
account of her actual and imputed political opinion.85 The court based its decision on
the applicant’s testimony, the direct words of the FARC, and evidence that the
FARC viewed members of a social group called the “Health Brigades” as opponents.86
The court found that the applicant’s refusal to cooperate with the FARC grew from
her political views and that the FARC’s violent responses were motivated by her
views.87 The court distinguished the case from INS v. Elias-Zacarias because of the
“post-refusal persecution” that the applicant in Martinez-Buendia suffered, which the
court interpreted as evidence that the FARC targeted Martinez-Buendia because it
believed she had voiced an anti-FARC political opinion.88
The disparate treatment between the asylum applicants in these two cases is
unfair and troubling. Despite the extremely similar factual setting, the MartinezBuendia court distinguished Rivera Barrientos v. Holder from INS v. Elias-Zacarias.
The Seventh Circuit was able to find a nexus89 to political opinion for the applicant
fleeing the FARC,90 yet the Tenth Circuit denied the existence of a nexus to political
opinion for the applicant fleeing the Central American gang.91
82. Id. at 1228.
83. Rivera Barrientos testified to having refused to join the gang several times because of her anti-gang

beliefs. Id. This testimony was found credible by the Immigration Judge and later ignored by the BIA. Id.

84. Collopy, supra note 79, at 453.
85. 616 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2010).
86. Id. at 717.
87.

Id.

88. Id.
89. To establish asylum eligibility, an applicant must show a nexus between past or feared future persecution

and one of the five protected grounds: race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a
particular social group. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012). In addition, an applicant must establish that
a protected ground “was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.” Id.

90. Martinez-Buendia, 616 F.3d at 716.
91.

Rivera Barrientos v. Holder, 658 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 2011). In Rivera Barrientos, the Tenth Circuit
failed to apply the proper standard when considering the motives of the persecutors. The INS has made
clear that persecutors may have several motives to do harm, some of which may be unrelated to any
protected ground. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). Therefore, there is no requirement that the persecutor be
motivated only by a protected belief or characteristic of the applicant. Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658, 662
(B.I.A. 1988), superseded by statute on other grounds, Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, as recognized in Gavilano Amado v. U.S.
Att’y Gen., 522 Fed. App’x 602 (11th Cir. 2013). All that needs to be established is that a protected ground
was at least one central reason for the persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). Therefore, the Tenth
Circuit applied the wrong standard because a protected ground does not need to be the primary reason for
the persecution, but rather one central reason for the persecution. A central reason has been construed to
mean a reason that is more than “incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason for
harm.” Quinteros-Mendoza v. Holder, 556 F.3d 159, 164 (4th Cir. 2009).
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This disparate treatment is caused by courts’ recognition of the FARC’s political
identity and courts’ refusal to characterize the Central American gangs as anything
other than criminal organizations, despite country condition reports and expert
testimony providing evidence that these gangs are political actors. Analysts from the
U.S. Army War College and the Strategic Studies Institute characterize Central
American gangs and organized crime groups as non-state actors engaged in efforts to
establish political domination.92 There is evidence that shows that these gangs are
attempting to change the political dynamic of certain countries.93 In particular, these
gangs are “infiltrating the country’s political structures, financing local elections in
order to secure the positions of [their choice of] candidates,” and even “sponsoring
students in law school who will act on their behalf as attorneys and judges.”94 The
Central American gangs have effectively rendered the states irrelevant in major
respects, and act as de facto governments.95 Therefore, courts’ views that Central
American gangs are only targeting and persecuting individuals for economic and
personal reasons misunderstand the reality of life in Central America.
B. Determining the Government’s Ability or Willingness to Control Persecutors

Asylum applicants may be eligible for asylum if the persecution was committed
either by the government or a non-state actor that the government is unable or
unwilling to control.96 Government actors generally include “the police, the military,
and government-run schools.”97 “If the persecutor is not a government actor, [asylum]
applicant[s] must show that the government was unable or unwilling to control the
persecutor.”98 Guerrilla groups, paramilitary groups, and gangs are, depending on the
situation, accepted as groups that the government is unable or unwilling to control.99

92.

Howard L. Gray, U.S. Army War Coll., Gangs and Transnational Criminals Threaten
Central American Stability 1 (2009), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a498136.pdf.

93.

Memorandum of Thomas Boerman, Ph. D. & Dir., Thomas Boerman Consulting LLC at 2, quoted in
Erin Quinn, Staff Att’y, Immigr. Legal Res. Ctr., Eunice Lee, Co-Legal Dir., Ctr. for Gender &
Refugee Studies, & Thomas Boerman, Presentation at the Immigration Legal Resource Center: Gang
Based Asylum Claims 109 (Nov. 3, 2015), http://textlab.io/doc/1988871/gang-based-asylum-claims--immigrant-legal-resource-center. Thomas Boerman is a recognized expert on gangs and other organized
criminal groups in El Salvador. Id. at 1. He has conducted extensive field research on Central American
gang activity both in the Central American region and in the United States. Id.

94. Id. at 2.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Mogharrabi, 19 I.

& N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).

97.

Immigration Equal., supra note 11, at 23.

98. Collopy, supra note 79, at 172–73.
99. Singh v. INS, 94 F.3d 1353, 1359–60 (9th Cir. 1996); Villalta, 20 I. & N. Dec. 142, 147 (B.I.A. 1990).

483

THE UNITED STATES IS UNWILLING TO PROTECT GANG-BASED ASYLUM APPLICANTS

Generally, “unable” means the government attempts to help the victims, but the
government’s attempts are futile.100 Determining whether a government is unable to
protect an asylum applicant requires a careful evaluation of the applicant’s own
testimony and country condition reports.101 “Unwilling” means that the government
does not even attempt to oppose the persecutors.102 Evidence of unwillingness might
be a refusal to investigate acts of violence or harassment, direct statements by the
government to the victims expressing unwillingness to protect them, or country
condition reports demonstrating that incidents of violence or harassment are regularly
uninvestigated.103
Yet, there are many Central American gang-based asylum claims in which courts
fail to find that the Central American governments are unable or unwilling to control
persecutors within their countries,104 despite the existence of country condition
reports that support such a determination.105
In Honduras, the government has been unable to impose any meaningful control
over the activities of the MS-13.106 The government’s security forces are “unable to
prevent MS-13 and other large, gangs’ operations.”107 “Investigators [in this area] are
overwhelmed, and only a tiny fraction of murders, extortions, kidnappings and other
gang-related criminal activities are ever fully investigated, much less prosecuted.”108
In El Salvador, there have been efforts, like the “Mano Dura” and “Ley AntiMara,” to control the gangs, but they have been ineffective.109 These efforts included
100. See Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 506–07 (9th Cir. 2013); H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 345 (B.I.A.

1996); Villalta, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 147.

101. See H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 345; Villalta, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 147.
102. See Joseph Hassell, Persecutor or Common Criminal? Assessing a Government’s Inability or Unwillingness to

Control Private Persecution, Immigr. L. Advisor, Sept. 2014, at 1, 16.

103. See Doe v. Holder, 736 F.3d 871, 878–79 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating that the “Russian police rejected [Doe’s]

first complaint . . . and subsequently dismissed his second complaint without doing anything more than
interviewing him at the hospital where he was being treated for his injuries,” id. at 879); Gathungu v.
Holder, 725 F.3d 900, 908–09 (8th Cir. 2013) (stating that the Kenyan government “ignor[ed] the
attacks altogether or ma[de] a show of arresting the Mungiki members but then releas[ed] them”).

104. See Castillo-Diaz v. Holder, 562 F.3d 23, 27 (1st Cir. 2009); Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 918, 921–

22 (8th Cir. 2005); Castro-Perez v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005); Lopez-Gomez v.
Ashcroft, 263 F.3d 442, 446 (5th Cir. 2001).

105. See Letter from Steven Dudley, Co-Dir., InSight Crime, to Leland Baxter Neal, Immigr. Law Grp. PC

(June 25, 2011) (on file with the New York Law School Immigration Law and Litigation Clinic). Steven
Dudley is the co-director of InSight Crime, “a joint initiative of American University and the Fundación
Ideas para la Paz in Colombia, South America.” Id. He has “conducted extensive research, including
field investigations, into the gangs such as the MS-13 and other, large organized criminal groups in
Central and South America.” Id.

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. WOLA, Youth Gangs in Central America: Issues in Human Rights, Effective Policing, and

Prevention 10 (2006); Steven Dudley, How ‘Mano Dura’ Is Strengthening Gangs, InSight Crime
(Nov. 21, 2010), http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/how-mano-dura-is-strengthening-gangs.
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detaining and arresting thousands of youths on the basis of their appearance,
associations, or home address. A majority of these arrests were not legitimate, did
not hold up in court, and fueled additional gang recruitment.110 In fact, these unduly
simplistic attempts to address the complex sociological, political, and economic
problems that these gangs present have been denounced by domestic and international
human rights organizations because of the egregious human rights violations that
have resulted.111 The perception that law enforcement and the government are unable
or unwilling to protect the citizens is widespread in El Salvador,112 where seeking the
assistance of the police is often perceived as not only futile, but also dangerous.113
In Guatemala, the MS-13 and M-18 are not controlled by the state.114 “The
government[] [is] powerless to control the[se] gangs or protect their citizens from
violence and forced gang recruitment . . . .”115 The citizens of Guatemala are
effectively without help from their police and government.116 El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras are “failed states” because they cannot protect their citizens from
these gangs.117
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Castro-Perez v. Gonzales118 highlights the disparate
treatment between asylum applicants of gang-based asylum claims and those with
NARC-based asylum claims. In Castro-Perez, a local gang leader raped the asylum
applicant twice.119 In support of her claim, the applicant submitted a country condition
report stating that rape is classified as a crime in the Honduran Penal Code.120 On the
basis of that report, the Ninth Circuit held that the applicant did not prove that the
government of Honduras was unable or unwilling to control rape in the country
because rape is classified as a crime in the Honduran Penal Code.121
The disparate treatment gang-based asylum applicants receive is further
highlighted by the courts’ treatment of asylum applicants in two FARC asylum cases:
110. Dudley, supra note 109.
111. Memorandum of Thomas Boerman, supra note 93, at 2.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 4.
114. Memorandum of Victoria Sanford, Ph.D., Dir., Ctr. for Human Rights & Peace Studies, Lehman Coll.

(Aug. 6, 2014) (on file with the New York Law School Immigration Law and Litigation Clinic). Victoria
Sanford is a professor and Chair of Anthropology at Lehman College. Id. She has “conducted extensive
field research with Maya communities in Guatemala . . . and Colombian Refugee communities in
Ecuador.” Id.

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 409 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2005).
119. Id. at 1070–71.
120. Id. at 1072.
121. Id.

485

THE UNITED STATES IS UNWILLING TO PROTECT GANG-BASED ASYLUM APPLICANTS

Arboleda v. Attorney General122 and Escobar v. Holder.123 In Arboleda, the Eleventh
Circuit granted asylum to a married couple who fled the FARC after being persecuted
because of the husband’s work with the Conservative Party.124 The Eleventh Circuit
based its reasoning on two country condition reports and data that proved the FARC
was a country-wide guerilla group.125 In Escobar, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
because of “the strength of the FARC in Colombia, . . . its ongoing war with the
Colombian government,” and the Colombian government’s inability to eliminate the
FARC, the “state action” element was easily met.126
This note does not contend that these FARC cases were wrongly decided, it
merely points out the disparate treatment between the two different groups of asylum
applicants. Gang-based asylum applicants are being denied asylum because courts
are not finding that the governments are unable or unwilling to control persecutors.
In FARC cases, numerous country condition reports are being used to grant asylum,
while in Central American gang-based cases, at least in certain examples, there is a
limited amount of country condition reports being used to deny asylum. Furthermore,
in Escobar, it was stated that the asylum applicant “easily” met the state action element
“[g]iven the strength of FARC in Colombia, its state-like status, its ongoing war
with the Colombian government, and the impotence of the government over
FARC.”127 All these descriptions can be used to describe Central American gangs
and Central American governments’ inability or unwillingness to control them.
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

A. Primary Solution

The primary solution is based in practicality: argue asylum claims differently for
applicants with gang-based asylum claims. There is an argument to be made that
these Central American gangs have taken control of a significant amount of territory
in Central America and are serving as de facto governments.128 Asylum applicants
have submitted varying asylum claims based on political opinion, but these claims
have not been widely accepted.129 Reasons for seeking asylum in these claims have

122. 434 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2006).
123. 657 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2011).
124. Arboleda, 434 F.3d at 1222.
125. Id. at 1224–25.
126. Escobar, 657 F.3d at 543.
127. Id.
128. Manwaring, supra note 9, at 21; Jillian N. Blake, Gang and Cartel Violence: A Reason to Grant Political

Asylum from Mexico and Central America, 38 Yale J. Int’l L. Online 31, 37 (2012).

129. Blake, supra note 128, at 31, 36, 45.
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included refusing to join the gangs,130 refusing to be extorted,131 and testifying as a
witness or serving as an informant.132 However, there have been some successes in
these categories, so there is reason to believe that there is a path to arguing more
gang-based asylum claims successfully.
First, asylum applicants need to clearly articulate their legal arguments.133 In
particular, they should separate the analysis of whether an expression or action is a
political opinion from whether the persecutors were motivated to harm the applicant
because of that political opinion.134 This is because identifying the political opinion
and the nexus are separate issues.135
Second, asylum applicants should identify the actual or imputed political opinion.
Political opinion can be “imputed” to an asylum applicant,136 so even if asylum
applicants do not actually have that political opinion, they can still be eligible for
asylum if they are persecuted for that “imputed” political opinion.137 Examples of
imputed political opinion in this context could include the persecution of children of
anti-gang political activists, family members of gang-resisters, or women who resist
being seen as property by a gang.138
Third, asylum applicants should demonstrate in the evidentiary record not just
their activities and the gang members’ knowledge of and reaction to those activities,
but also the gang’s operations as de facto governments.139
Fourth, asylum applicants and their counsel will need to address Elias-Zacarias.
In this case, the Supreme Court held that forced recruitment by a guerilla group was
not necessarily persecution on account of political opinion.140 However, the case has
been interpreted to mean that gangs do not persecute individuals on account of
130. Mayorga-Vidal v. Holder, 675 F.3d 9, 17–19 (1st Cir. 2012); Rivera Barrientos v. Holder, 658 F.3d 1222,

1225 (10th Cir. 2011); Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 26–27 (1st Cir. 2010); MarroquinOchoma v. Holder, 574 F.3d 574, 579 (8th Cir. 2009).

131. Marroquin-Ochoma, 574 F.3d at 578; Quinteros-Mendoza v. Holder, 556 F.3d 159, 164 (4th Cir. 2009);

Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 2007).

132. Zelaya v. Holder, 668 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2012); Velasco-Cervantes v. Holder, 593 F.3d 975, 978

(9th Cir. 2010), overruled by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013); Soriano v.
Holder, 569 F.3d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009), overruled by Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d 1081.

133. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012).
134. See id.; Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 655–56 (9th Cir. 2000).
135. See Navas, 217 F.3d at 655–56.
136. Uwais v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 478 F.3d 513, 517 (2d Cir. 2007); Mulanga v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 123, 133 n.7

(3d Cir. 2003); Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1489 (9th Cir. 1997); Singh v. Ilchert, 69 F.3d 375, 379
(9th Cir. 1995); Canas-Segovia v. INS, 970 F.2d 599, 601–02 (9th Cir. 1992).

137. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992); Hamdan v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 986, 992–93 (7th Cir.

2008); Pascual v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 483, 488 (6th Cir. 2007); Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1195
(9th Cir. 2007).

138. Garcia-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 1066, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004); S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 497

(B.I.A. 1996).

139. See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 482–83.
140. Id. at 482–84.
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political opinion.141 Therefore, asylum applicants must be able to distinguish their
case from Elias-Zacarias by demonstrating (1) clear, direct expression of political
opinion, (2) that persecution is on account of political opinion, and (3) that
persecution occurred after the political opinions became known.142
B. Alternative Legal Solutions

Courts should appreciate that gang-based asylum claims can be difficult,
especially in light of conflicting case law. In deciding whether to pursue a gangbased asylum case, advocates should also consider other legal relief that may be
available through such avenues as the Convention Against Torture (CAT),143 Special
Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS),144 the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),145
or T146 nonimmigrant status.
“Relief under the [CAT] is [another] form of relief an individual fearing
persecution can seek.”147 To receive CAT relief, the applicants must establish that
more likely than not they will be tortured if they are returned to their country of
origin.148 Torture is defined as:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or
a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a

141. See Mayorga-Vidal v. Holder, 675 F.3d 9, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2012); Rivera Barrientos v. Holder, 658 F.3d

1222, 1227–28 (10th Cir. 2011); Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2010); MarroquinOchoma v. Holder, 574 F.3d 574, 578–79 (8th Cir. 2009); Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 856 (9th Cir.
2009); Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 862 (9th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other grounds by
Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013); Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738,
747 (9th Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d 1081.

142. See Kate M. Manuel, Cong. Research Serv., R43716, Asylum and Gang Violence: Legal

Overview 11–12 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43716.pdf.

143. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,

adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 112.

144. Congress created SIJS in 1990, and designed it for “children in the United States who do not have

permanent residence and have been abused, neglected or abandoned by one or both parents.” History of
SIJ Status, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Serv., https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/special-immigrantjuveniles/history-sij-status (last updated July 12, 2011).

145. Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18,

28, and 42 U.S.C.), invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000). VAWA was
created in 1994 as “a comprehensive legislative package targeting violence against women.” History of
VAWA, FaithTrust Inst., http://www.ncdsv.org/images/HistoryofVawa.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).

146. Congress created the T nonimmigrant status in 2000 by passing the Victims of Trafficking and Violence

Protection Act (VTVPA) of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended at 22
U.S.C. §§ 7101–7110 (2012)); Victims of Human Trafficking: T Nonimmigrant Status, U.S. Citizenship
& Immigr. Serv., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/victims-human-trafficking-other-crimes/
victims-human-trafficking-t-nonimmigrant-status (last updated Oct. 3, 2011). The VTVPA enhanced
law enforcement agencies’ ability to “investigate” and “offer protection to victims.” Id.

147. Immigration Equal., supra note 11, at 37.
148. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2) (2017).
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third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by . . . a
public official or other person acting in an official capacity.149

Further, “an individual who is successful under a CAT claim cannot be removed
from the United States to the country from which she fled persecution, but can be
removed to a third country if one is available.”150
SIJS is another form of immigration relief, but it is limited to juveniles.151 It is
available to “certain undocumented immigrants under the age of 21 who have been
abused, neglected, or abandoned by one or both parents.”152 To qualify for SIJS, an
immigrant juvenile must meet certain criteria. The applicant must be: (1) under
twenty-one years old; (2) unmarried; (3) declared dependent in a juvenile court; (4)
unable to reunite with one or both of her parents because of abuse, neglect,
abandonment, or a similar basis under state law; and (5) in a situation in which it
would be against her best interests to return to her country of nationality or last
habitual residence.153 “Once a minor receives SIJS, [she] will be able to adjust [her]
status to that of a lawful permanent resident, obtain work authorization, and
eventually apply for U.S. citizenship.”154
VAWA, which provides another form of immigration relief, seeks to protect
women from spousal abuse.155 It provides immigration status for certain battered
noncitizens.156 Those eligible individuals include the abused spouse of a U.S. citizen
or permanent resident, the abused parent of a U.S. citizen, and the abused child of a
U.S. citizen or permanent resident.157 Applicants must provide extensive evidence to

149. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, supra

note 143, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 113–14.

150. Immigration Equal., supra note 11, at 37. Applicants who are denied asylum in one country can apply

for asylum in another country under certain conditions, such as: (1) being an unaccompanied minor; (2)
having family in the third country; or (3) having a valid visa or not needing a visa to enter the third
country. Id. at 46.

151. Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, Safe Passage Project, http://www.safepassageproject.org/what-is-

sij-status (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).

152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Allan Wernick, Domestic Abuse Victims Who Are Seeking Their Green Cards Can Turn to Law for Help,

N.Y. Daily News (Mar. 25, 2016, 4:11 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/citizenship-now/
abuse-victims-seeking-green-cards-turn-law-article-1.2577265.

156. Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), ICWC, http://icwclaw.org/services-available/violence-against-

women-act-vawa (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).

157. Battered Spouse, Children & Parents, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Serv., https://www.uscis.gov/

humanitarian/battered-spouse-children-parents (last updated Feb. 16, 2016).
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prove battery, abuse, extreme cruelty, and proof of the qualifying relationship to the
abuser.158 Once relief under VAWA is granted,
immigrants are classified into categories based on a preference system. Selfpetitioners who are immediate relatives of U.S. Citizens . . . are eligible to
adjust status to a lawful permanent resident status when their VAWA petition
is approved. Spouses and children of lawful permanent residents must wait
for an immigrant visa to become available for their category. These petitioners
will be able to obtain work authorization until they are eligible to apply for
permanent residency.159

One final form of potential relief is the T nonimmigrant visa,160 created by the
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (VTVPA).161 The VTVPA is
aimed at strengthening the U.S. law enforcement’s ability to investigate and prosecute
human trafficking.162 It also protects those who are or have been victims of human
trafficking by allowing them to remain in the United States.163 To be eligible for a T
nonimmigrant visa, applicants must be victims of trafficking, be located in the
United States (or certain other specified territories), be able to comply with reasonable
requests from a law enforcement agency to assist in the investigation or prosecution
of human trafficking, demonstrate that they would suffer extreme hardship involving
unusual and severe harm if removed from the United States, and not be inadmissible164
to the United States.165
V. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, asylum applicants with gang-based asylum claims receive unfair
treatment in their asylum proceedings. In particular, asylum applicants from Central
America with gang-based asylum claims receive different, less favorable treatment
than asylum applicants from Colombia with FARC-based asylum claims. The
genesis of this disparate treatment stems from the political or criminal origins of
each group, despite both groups currently acting as criminal organizations with
political control. The primary solution is to adjust the legal approach and strategies
taken by the legal counsel of gang-based asylum applicants. The alternative solution
158. Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), supra note 156.
159. Id.
160. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T) (2012).
161. 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7110 (2012); Victims of Human Trafficking: T Nonimmigrant Status, supra note 146.
162. Victims of Human Trafficking: T Nonimmigrant Status, supra note 146.
163. Id.
164. “In order to gain entry to the U.S., a foreign national must meet all applicable statutory requirements

and must demonstrate that [she] is not inadmissible under INA § 212(a).” Sarah E. Murphy, Grounds of
Inadmissibility, Border Immigr. Law., http://www.borderimmigrationlawyer.com/grounds-of-inadmissibility
(last visited Apr. 6, 2017). For a list of grounds applied for inadmissibility, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a).

165. Victims of Human Trafficking: T Nonimmigrant Status, supra note 146.
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is to utilize other legal remedies to provide protection for Central Americans who are
fleeing gang-based persecution.
Our courts’ treatment of most of the thousands of Central Americans fleeing
gang-based persecution is unjust.166 The United States should no longer subscribe to
the fiction that these gangs are mere criminal organizations. The gangs are de facto
governments in large areas of Central America and are causing mass migrations of
human beings because of their violent and destructive control. Already, there have
been many instances in which individuals denied gang-based asylum were
immediately murdered upon their return to Central America.167 It is time for the
United States to begin to treat asylum applicants who are fleeing Central American
gangs like they do asylum applicants who are fleeing the FARC.

166. See Selena Hill, Central Americans Denied Asylum in US Killed upon Return, Latin Post (Oct. 14, 2015,

4:45 PM), http://www.latinpost.com/articles/86876/20151014/immigration-news-us-deporting-centralamerican-asylum-seekers-who-are-then-killed-in-hometowns-report-found.htm; Laura Tillman, Meet
Luis. He Fled Gangs in Honduras. But the U.S. Probably Won’t Protect Him., New Republic (June 26,
2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/118422/why-doesnt-america-protect-latino-migrants-f leeingviolent-gangs.

167. Sibylla Brodzinsky et al., US Government Deporting Central American Migrants to Their Deaths,

Guardian (Oct. 12, 2015, 8:57 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/oct/12/obamaimmigration-deportations-central-america.

491

SIM CITY

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

www.nylslawreview.com

